In Dooboree v MRA [2025 SCJ 341], the Supreme Court of Mauritius upheld a plea in limine litis raised by the MRA, ruling that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under section 4(1) of the Public Officers' Protection Act (POPA). This decision, however, raises significant concerns regarding the identification of the act which triggers the limitation period. 

The Facts in Dooboree: A 17-Year Delay

In Dooboree, the plaintiff’s goods were seized by MRA officers in November 2003. From that point onward, the plaintiff made numerous attempts to recover his goods. For 17 years, he was met with bureaucratic inertia, and it is only in July 2020 that the MRA formally notified the plaintiff that he could retrieve the detained goods. By that time, the goods had deteriorated and were worthless.

The plaint, eventually filed in July 2022, alleged “faute lourde” based on the unlawful and reckless conduct of the MRA and its préposés; acts that extended well beyond the original seizure.

The Legal Principle

The Supreme Court in Mungroo v The State of Mauritius [2007 SCJ 326] laid down a strict but clear interpretation of section 4(1) of POPA: “The action must under pain of nullity be instituted within two years from the date of the act giving rise to it.”

However, and crucially, a subsequent decision in Food Paradise Co Ltd v The Ministry of Health and Quality of Life & Anor [2019 SCJ 269] has emphasized that in cases involving the detention of goods by public authorities, there is a distinction between the initial seizure and a subsequent refusal to release the goods upon request. It is the latter, the refusal, that has been identified as the actionable omission which triggers the start of the two-year limitation in cases of seizure of goods:

“As regards the delay, it is clear from the wording of section 4(1) that the plaint shall, under the pain of nullity, be instituted within 2 years from the date of the fact, act, or omission which has given rise to the plaint. The analysis of the learned Magistrate and his finding that the material act is the refusal of the initial request for the release of the goods prior to 10 July 2011 is clear on this issue, and we have no reason to disturb his ruling, given that the plaint is dated 24 June 2015 … Indeed, the impugned act, as averred in the proecipe, is that of refusing the release of the aforesaid goods and not their unlawful detention.”

This has also been applied in the case of Food Paradise Co Ltd v. Permanent Secretary, The Ministry of Health and Quality of Life & Anor [2023 INT 356]: “This finding is in line with the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court sitting on appeal in the case of Food Paradise Co Ltd v. The Ministry of Health and Quality of Life and anor 2019 SCJ 269, where the facts were similar to the present case and the Supreme Court endorsed the finding of the learned Magistrate to the effect that the material act is the refusal of the initial request for release of goods.”

Analysis

It is clear upon a perusal of the judgment in Dooboree that the judge took the material act to be November 2003, which is when the seizure occurred and nowhere in the judgement do they delve into when the requests were actually denied. In fact, the judgment clearly states that: “On 27 November 2003, a search was carried out by the officers of the MRA and his storeroom was sealed. On that day, he reported a complaint against civil servants whilst performing their duty at Goodlands Police Station.” and “On several occasions, he made written requests for the detained goods to be released, but he was always informed that the file was either with the police or at the DPP’s office.” Mr. Dooboree’s requests were in fact never denied; they were simply unanswered, leaving him in the dark. In that case, when should he have started proceedings then? Is it on the day of the seizure, which is before any prior investigation by the police or the DPP? Or is it when he was left unanswered about the whereabouts of his file? Therefore, this begs the question: when did the clock start ticking for Mr. Dooboree?

The Court’s Reasoning

Despite this factual complexity, the court in Dooboree held that the cause of action arose in November 2003, the date of the original seizure. The judge dismissed the argument that the letter of July 2020, or any of the subsequent refusals to return the goods, could constitute the act giving rise to the cause of action. This approach disregards the evolving nature of the wrong and instead fixates on the initial administrative act.

The judgment in Dooboree also does not explain why it departs from the logic of Food Paradise where the refusal, not the seizure, was the key moment. This inconsistency undermines legal certainty.

Conclusion: Should Parliament Reconsider POPA’s Rigidity?

This approach echoes the stance taken in Deira v Mulloo & Ors [2020 SCJ 340]: “It was, however, held that whilst the fairness of the 2 year limitation  period  might  be a matter  for  debate,  the  meaning  of  the  law  was  clear  and the  law should  be  applied  as passed  by  Parliament.    The  delay  should  start  running  as  from  the  date  of  the  fact  or  act giving  rise  to  the action. The Mauritian  Courts  cannot  import  provisions  of  the  law  from England where the primary limitation period for personal injury cases runs from the accrual of the cause of action or the date of the claimant’s knowledge of the relevant injury.”

Thus, we must now ask the unavoidable question:

Is it high time that the legislator reviews section 4(1) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act?

If the law bars individuals from seeking redress where the State itself has delayed action for decades, does it still serve the balance between public protection and accountability, or does it foster institutional impunity? Should we import provisions of the law from England?

Reforming POPA to allow judicial discretion, or to provide exceptions for continuing or latent harm, as is the case in several other jurisdictions, could help restore faith in administrative justice without unduly burdening public officers acting in good faith.

Until then, claimants like Mr. Dooboree who waited 17 years for a response, only to be told he waited too long, will continue to find themselves caught in a system that leaves them without recourse.