Judicial review in Mauritius has long operated in the shadow of a single, elusive word: “promptly”. While intended to ensure procedural discipline, the absence of a defined time limit left applicants navigating uncertainty and courts exercising wide discretion. The Courts (Amendment) Act 2025 seeks to remove ambiguity surrounding the timing of leave applications.

The guiding principles in judicial review matter was, as provided under the UK Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Schedule 1, RSC Order 53 Rule 4, that it must be brought “promptly” and in any event within three (3) months, which was considered to be a longstop. However, the elephant in the room has long been: “How prompt is prompt enough?” This uncertainty was not merely academic. It shaped litigation strategy, influenced whether matters were pursued at all, and often became a preliminary battleground before the merits of a case were ever addressed.

In C-Care v Employment Relations Tribunal [2022] UKPC 58, the Law Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the definition of “promptly” will depend on the use of the discretionary power of judges based on the particular context and specific facts of the case before them. The concept of “three months” was more of a yardstick than a guarantee.

The Courts (Amendment) Act 2025 now amends Section 71 of the Courts Act 1945 such that the leave stage, which previously lacked codified procedure, is now expressly placed within the authority of the Judge in Chambers according to the newly added Sub-part VIA.

The new Sub-part VIA lays down the procedure to apply for judicial review. The start of the journey for judicial review remains as is, i.e. there shall be no application unless leave of the Court (now, the Judge in Chambers) is obtained. In addition, an applicant shall now apply for leave within forty-five (45) days of the date of the decision of the administrative body. As can be seen from the parliamentary debates surrounding the amendment, the legislature deliberately chose to “middle the diddle” by fixing the new time limit of 45 days to seek leave, which is exactly half of the old three-months yardstick.

From a practitioner’s perspective, this clarity is significant. Advising clients is no longer an exercise in risk assessment around an elastic notion of “promptness.” The timeline is now visible and enforceable. The objective is clear: greater efficiency in public law litigation, without unduly foreclosing access to justice.

It should be noted however that the Judge in Chambers still retains a discretionary power to entertain an application outside the prescribed delay, on “good cause” shown by the applicant. It will be interesting to see how our judges use this discretion so as not to defeat the legislative purpose behind the amendment. Hopefully, it will not be a case of the focus shifting from debating whether an application was “prompt” to defining what amounts to “good cause”. How generously or restrictively this discretion is exercised will determine whether the reform operates as a safety valve or a strict procedural filter.

Further, once an application for leave is lodged, the Judge in Chambers is tasked with determining the application within sixty (60) days. The 60-day delay is important in preventing the kind of injustice that arises when cases remain unresolved for years, leaving applicants with no relief or further cause of action simply because by the time a judgment is finally delivered, the matter is no longer a “live issue”.

What is strikingly new with this amendment is the power that is given to the applicant to report the matter to the Chief Justice should the Judge in Chambers fail to determine the application for leave within the prescribed delay. It remains to be seen whether this is the first of a series of legislative amendments aiming to ensure the accountability of the judiciary.

Once leave is granted, the application for leave automatically becomes the application for judicial review which will surely be welcomed by legal practitioners and applicants alike. The Judge in Chambers must then fix the matter for mention before the Chief Justice to ensure procedural readiness. The substantive hearing must be conducted by at least two Judges and, where possible, include the Judge who granted leave.

The Courts (Amendment) Act 2025 therefore marks a decisive recalibration of judicial review in Mauritius from discretion to clearly defined procedural obligations. The intention was clear: to strike a balance between efficiency in public law litigation and fairness to those dissatisfied with administrative decisions. Whether this reform ultimately enhances access to justice will now have to be assessed from a practical perspective. What is certain, however, is that judicial review has entered a more structured era.

N.B. The Courts (Amendment) Act 2025 has come into operation on 05 January 2026.