Introduction

Zimbabwe's proposed Mines and Minerals Bill of 2025 marks the most significant attempt to overhaul the country's mining legislation in decades. While the bill introduces sweeping changes, across the industry, one of its most consequential proposals is the abolition of extra-lateral rights.

This analysis delves into the implications of this change for a sector built on over sixty years of this legal principle.

A Fundamental Shift in Mining Title

Extra-lateral rights allow the holder of a mining claim to pursue a reef or lode beyond the vertical sidelines of their surface block as it dips underground. The 2025 Bill seeks to end this foundational concept. Its Explanatory Memorandum clearly states an objective where "the holding of extra-lateral rights are more carefully regulated or abolished". The bill achieves this decisively in Clause 139, which confines all mining rights to "within the vertical limits of his or her mining location". This redefines the very geometry of a mining title, effectively confining all operations to the vertical planes extending downwards from a claim's surface boundaries.

Legislative Precedent and the Lack of a Transitional Clause

This is not a new legislative ambition. The Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill of 2015 also proposed to repeal the definition of "extra-lateral right". However, the 2025 Bill is more absolute and, critically, lacks a transitional mechanism for operations built on this long-standing right.

The crux of the issue lies in Clause 334 of the new bill. While it states that any mining right

"legally held at that date, is... hereby confirmed", it adds that such rights "shall from and after that date be held under and be subject to this Act".

By subjecting old titles to a new Act that defines them strictly vertically, the law effectively extinguishes pre-existing extra-lateral rights without explicit compensation or a phase-out period.

Impact on Existing Operations

Many mining entities have based their entire mine feasibility studies and Net Present Value (NPV) models on their total mineable resource, which for many Zimbabwean mines, includes deposits that extend laterally. Lenders and investors value a mine based on this defined asset base. The sudden removal of these rights would effectively shrink the asset against which financing was secured, potentially placing many operations in breach of loan covenants and severely impacting future investment appeal.

The on-the-ground effects of this immediate abolition are staggering. Mines in Matebeleland, for example, have established extensive lateral development, with cross-cuts and drives on ore extending up to 2.3 kilometres from their primary vertical shafts. Stakeholders estimate that re-establishing vertical access requires approximately US$120,000 and at least a year for every 200 metres. For a 2.3-kilometre depth, this translates to a baseline cost of nearly US$1.4 million and over a decade of development time. Depending on the geological terrain and the full scope of works required to make the excavation fully operational, that figure could soar significantly higher. This would render billions of dollars in existing development—now stranded assets—as unrecoverable sunk costs.

Conclusion

The sentiment among stakeholders is not to oppose modernization but to ensure a just transition. The most viable solution is the inclusion of a "grandfather clause". Such a provision would allow pre-existing mining operations, developed in good faith under the old law, to continue exercising their established extra-lateral rights for the life of the mine. All new mining titles issued after the commencement of the 2025 Act would then be subject to the new, vertically-confined regime. This approach balances the government's goal of simplifying titles with the critical need to protect historical investment and ensure the stability of the mining sector.